In August 2026, an open letter to Iranian political prisoners published in The Guardian and signed by Judith Butler, Angela Davis and others sparked fierce debate within the international left. Mehrdad Mohammadi examines both sides of the controversy. He argues that, despite their disagreements, the signatories and their anti-imperialist critics share one assumption: that they have the right to define what Iranian struggles mean. Whether through neo-orientalism or neo-colonial tutelage, both subordinate Iranians’ freedom to narratives and timetables they have not chosen. The author calls for a solidarity that is open to being challenged by the very people it claims to defend.
Solidarity with Iranians apparently comes with conditions. Their suffering must confirm an approved account of imperialism, their aspirations must resemble those of their advocates, and their freedom must arrive at a geopolitically convenient moment. The dispute surrounding the Guardian’s open letter to Iranian political prisoners exposes these conditions. Its authors and anti-imperialist critics disagree about the Islamic Republic, yet repeatedly reserve for themselves the authority to determine what Iranian struggles mean.
The letter describes prisoners trapped between domestic repression and foreign aggression: two blades of scissors. Its critics reject this symmetry. One side, they argue, wages imperialist war; the other defends an independent country. Vijay Prashad declares that no neutral or “third space” exists. I reach the same conclusion from the opposite direction. There is no defensible position that celebrates the Islamic Republic’s regional project while disowning the domestic apparatus sustaining it. We must stand against that governing project. The two blades make sense precisely because the regime’s policies connect them.
The disagreement concerns who may interpret Iranian struggles and set their priorities. Visibility is not political recognition: intellectual prestige, influential platforms, and moral standing can privilege advocates’ interpretations over prisoners’ own accounts. Even sympathetic representation becomes paternalistic when prisoners serve as witnesses for predetermined conclusions. Their judgments must be able to challenge assigned identities and expose differences that the letter’s authors, supporters, and opponents cannot absorb into a single narrative of liberation.
I examine two related tendencies: selective recognition and political tutelage. Selective recognition welcomes Iranian voices when they confirm an established framework and discounts them when they challenge it. This is the neo-orientalist tendency at issue: a hierarchy of representation renewed through solidarity, in which Iranians appear as courageous resisters or deserving victims while their authority to interpret their struggles remains restricted. Their advocates’ commitments become insulated from correction by the people they claim to support.
By neo-colonialism, I mean political tutelage: the paradoxical colonization of Iranian life in the name of anti-colonialism. This deliberately extends the term beyond indirect economic and geopolitical control. Iranian freedom is recognized in principle but subordinated to strategic objectives whose importance, timetable, and acceptable costs are determined for Iranians rather than by them. The object of colonization is the horizon of Iranian possibility: what Iranians may want, how they may understand their oppression, and which futures they are permitted to pursue.
These tendencies operate differently across the debate. The Guardian letter risks assuming political agreement through a shared vocabulary of liberation. Critics who explicitly defer domestic demands make support for prisoners conditional on its compatibility with the state’s confrontation with foreign powers. The former risk prescribing the meaning of Iranian agency; the latter prescribe its timing and political weight. Both risk recognizing Iranians only when their aspirations resemble their advocates’ own.
Opposition to foreign aggression and domestic repression can coexist and often go hand in hand, provided solidarity leaves these political questions open. Confronting foreign powers does not make a government emancipatory; that confrontation usually itself becomes a justification for intensifying repression at home. Nor does defending prisoners establish their allegiance to their defenders’ political traditions. Solidarity becomes accountable when Iranian voices can revise its judgments, including its assumptions about resistance, revolution, and liberation.
The Letter: Selective Recognition and Neo-Orientalism
The Guardian letter moves between domestic repression and foreign intervention, juxtaposing the 1988 prison executions with what the authors call the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh. Both histories matter. But their pairing establishes the framework into which prisoners’ experiences are placed. The question is whether those experiences can challenge that framework, including its assumptions about anti-imperialism and liberation.
The Guardian letter describes the Islamic Republic’s anti-imperialism as “hollow,” but it is unclear what makes it hollow. If anti-imperialism means sustained opposition to American and Israeli power, the regime’s military operations, regional alliances, and support for armed organizations give that opposition material substance. If the authors instead mean that this opposition does not advance freedom or emancipation, they should make that distinction explicit. Anti-imperialism can be real without being emancipatory. Calling the regime’s version “hollow” also requires explaining why similar opposition gives its allies anti-imperialist standing but does not qualify the regime itself.
Judith Butler, a prominent signatory, illustrates this difficulty. In a 2012 clarification, Butler called classifying Hamas and Hezbollah within the “global left” through their anti-imperialist identification “merely descriptive,” distinguishing classification from endorsement and reaffirming nonviolence. In “After Pantin”, Butler similarly distinguished describing October 7 as armed resistance from justifying its atrocities. These qualifications sharpen the inconsistency: if anti-imperialist identification places these organizations within the global left without endorsing their conduct, why is their Iranian sponsor’s anti-imperialism dismissed as “hollow” rather than assessed through the same distinction between classification and moral approval? Without attributing Butler’s views to every signatory, this exposes a double standard wherever geopolitical alignment grants progressive standing to the regime’s allies but becomes insufficient for the regime itself. Consistency requires recognizing that the Islamic Republic’s anti-imperialism can be substantive and oppressive, or reconsidering why anti-imperialist alignment should confer progressive standing on its allies at all.
On this narrow question, the letter’s opponents have the stronger argument. Prashad defends the substance of Tehran’s commitment, declaring that “none has paid so high a price for that commitment.” A state sustaining such a confrontation cannot plausibly be dismissed as merely performing opposition. But his formulation conceals another question: who determines the policy, and who pays its price? Rulers’ decisions and sacrifices imposed on a population cannot simply be merged into the collective subject “Iran.” Suffering does not establish consent.
Calling the regime’s anti-imperialism hollow protects an idealized category from its troubling consequences. Failure is assigned to an allegedly inauthentic example, leaving the association between anti-imperialism and emancipation undisturbed. The more difficult possibility is that the regime’s anti-imperialism is substantive and that the project organized around it sustains domestic domination.
This possibility requires examining domestic and foreign policy together. The Revolutionary Guards’ domestic and regional functions belong to the same institutional structure. The apparatus conducting confrontation abroad secures authority at home. External conflict justifies concentrated power; dissent becomes foreign interference; demands for freedom become threats to state survival. Regional strategy cannot be celebrated as progressive resistance while the coercion sustaining it is dismissed as an unrelated authoritarian deviation.
The letter’s selective recognition also appears in its identification of victims. Workers, unemployed people, Kurds, Arabs, Baloch, and Afghan migrants receive explicit attention. Women resisting compulsory veiling, Baha’is, and secular, nationalist, or monarchist opponents receive no comparable specificity. No short letter can enumerate everyone, and omission alone does not prove exclusion. Nevertheless, the pattern privileges constituencies already recognizable within progressive narratives of class exploitation, ethnic oppression, and displacement.
Victims become politically “saleable” before they are recognized as people entitled to reject the vocabulary through which they are presented. Even the named constituencies contain disagreements that this representation can conceal. A worker may reject socialism; a member of an ethnic minority may support monarchy. Neither forfeits their freedom by disappointing international advocates. Solidarity becomes exclusionary when ideological familiarity determines whose aspirations receive recognition.
The letter presents an incomplete picture of the Evin attack, highlighting the hospital ward, transgender section, and visitor centre, the spaces most readily aligned with its progressive narrative. It leaves out another important part of the picture: those killed also included judicial and prosecution officials, guards, and officials from the Intelligence Ministry’s Section 209, according to Human Rights Watch. These institutions form part of the Islamic Republic’s apparatus of repression. By foregrounding certain spaces while leaving that apparatus out of view, the letter obscures Evin’s central role in imprisoning and persecuting the very people it claims to support.
There is a revealing precedent. The 2022 appeal Listen to the Voices of a Feminist Revolution in Iran, which Angela Davis and Judith Butler supported, explicitly criticized neo-orientalism within supposedly progressive representations that subordinated Iranian resistance to Western concerns. The standard invoked here therefore comes from an appeal they themselves endorsed. It must also apply to the Guardian letter, which both signed: Iranian voices must be allowed to challenge their advocates’ political assumptions, rather than receive recognition only through them. The earlier appeal’s own vocabulary deserves the same scrutiny. Feminist, anti-capitalist, or anti-fascist commitments cannot be presumed to exhaust an uprising’s meaning. The double standard begins when those who condemn neo-orientalism stop listening precisely where Iranians reject their preferred account of liberation.
The Critics: Deferred Freedom and Neo-Colonial Tutelage
The letter’s critics make the hierarchy more explicit. Iranian freedom is acknowledged, but its pursuit must accommodate the state’s confrontation with foreign powers. Carlos Martinez supplies the timetable: domestic politics can be settled “afterwards.” Allegations of repression become material for regime-change propaganda, while preserving independence takes precedence.
This is realpolitik expressed through the language of anti-imperialism. State survival, strategic advantages, and the balance of power determine when demands for freedom deserve support. These critics reproduce the logic they condemn in the global order: people’s rights become negotiable when they interfere with a strategically valuable state. Calling that state anti-imperialist changes the beneficiary of this hierarchy without changing its governing principle.
Yet prisoners are already attempting to determine their country’s future. Their imprisonment is how the government obstructs that effort. Promising future self-determination while subordinating its present exercise to state survival empties the promise of substance. Nothing establishes when the postponement ends. Each confrontation can renew it.
Realpolitik supplies the justification; political tutelage assigns the costs. Others determine the overriding historical objective and decide which demands must yield to it. Iranians bear the cost of waiting. The presumed right to allocate that cost gives the argument its neo-colonial character, even as it speaks in the language of national independence. The paradox is that Iranian sovereignty is defended at the level of territory while being restricted at the level of political life: the country is entitled to independence, but Iranians themselves are denied equivalent authority to determine what that independence should mean, what they may demand from their government, and which political futures they may pursue.
Such tutelage depends on conflating government and population. Prashad’s description of “the state and society being cut” absorbs the antagonism between prisoners and jailers into a supposedly common interest. State strategy becomes national resistance. Society’s disagreement with that strategy becomes a complication assessed through its possible usefulness to foreign enemies. The state’s interest in avoiding scrutiny is thereby presented as the population’s interest in avoiding domination.
Military capacity becomes an alibi for repression in Hamid Dabashi’s argument. His claim that the Islamic Republic has preserved the lives and dignity of more than 90 million people erases those whose lives it has destroyed and whose dignity it systematically violates. What does this supposed protection mean to prisoners tortured by its interrogators, families mourning those it executed, or women punished for asserting control over their own bodies? His demand for the release of political prisoners does not resolve this contradiction. The political implication is grotesque: Iranians are asked to recognize their jailers and executioners as national protectors because their confrontation with foreign powers supposedly earns them gratitude. Defending territory neither erases responsibility for repression nor entitles a government to appreciation from those it brutalizes.
What Disappears into “Whatever”
Prashad writes: “One is the blade of imperialist war. The other, whatever its internal contradictions, is the state and society being cut.” The phrase “whatever its internal contradictions” reduces imprisonment, torture, and executions to secondary problems that do not disturb his support for the state. By placing state and society together on the receiving end of imperialist violence, he obscures the violence that the state itself inflicts on society. Repression is acknowledged, then denied any consequence for his political judgment. What could the Islamic Republic do to its own people that would make him reconsider, if every abuse can be set aside as an “internal contradiction”?
Related logic reduces systematic abuse to an imperfection weighed against strategic importance. Abulhawa’s “nobody is perfect” remark captures this politics: freedom from political imprisonment becomes an excessive demand for purity, while the government’s geopolitical value remains protected from the implications of its conduct.
Her response to the Guardian letter develops the same logic through an accounting exercise: applying an estimated American wrongful-imprisonment rate to an estimated Iranian political-prisoner population. The calculation establishes nothing about those cases. It also obscures a basic distinction: a conviction can comply with a law that unjustly criminalizes dissent. Together, the appeal to imperfection and the numerical comparison make prisoners’ claims an acceptable cost of a supposedly greater struggle.
The same strategic calculus shapes Prashad’s presentation of Soleimani’s regional network as a defensive shield. Describing its purpose as defensive supplies no evidence of popular consent to its operation or its costs. His opposition to executions does not resolve the contradiction when public pressure remains conditional on geopolitical usefulness. The jailer’s strategic value determines how urgently the prisoner deserves support. Soleimani, the architect of the regime’s regional network, was also a prominent military figure who repeatedly threatened dissenters inside Iran. His role illustrates the continuity between the regime’s regional strategy and its domestic repression.
Whatever, afterwards, and nobody is perfect give this realpolitik its vocabulary of accommodation. They acknowledge suffering, postpone its claims, and preserve the political commitment that makes postponement acceptable. Those assigning these costs do not bear them. Their solidarity permits recognition of repression while withholding the consequence that recognition should carry: the possibility of revising support for the state responsible.
What If Iranians Reject the Islamic Revolution Itself?
Political tutelage governs the meaning of resistance as well as its timing. It becomes especially intrusive when opponents of the Islamic Republic are assigned an allegiance to the revolution that produced it. Here, preserving the state’s anti-imperialist role becomes a boundary around the political futures its opponents are permitted to pursue.
Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi’s alternative letter recognizes prisoners as actors while locating their struggle within the unfinished promises and anti-imperialist inheritance of 1979. For those who reject that inheritance, this interpretation erases their existence as independent political subjects. Their bodies remain visible in prison; the convictions behind their resistance disappear. They are permitted to act, provided their actions can be reconciled with the history he wants preserved.
Consider the refusals expressed in Iranian protest slogans: “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon; my life for Iran”; “Our enemy is right here; they lie when they say it is America”; “This is the last battle; Pahlavi will return”; and “Sickle, hammer, turban; 1979 is over.”
These slogans do not establish every prisoner’s politics. They articulate positions that cannot honestly be absorbed into a project of completing 1979. Their rejection reaches the revolution’s regional priorities, designation of enemies, and political inheritance. Recasting that rejection as revolutionary continuity reverses its declared meaning.
This is political appropriation. The advocate preserves his preferred history by depriving dissenters of authority over their opposition. The exclusion is especially stark because it occurs in the language of recognizing agency. Iranians may speak, but their words are translated back into commitments they reject. Their freedom must include the right to reject the revolution altogether, including the geopolitical commitments that its international defenders consider indispensable.
Solidarity without Tutelage: No Third Space
The scissors metaphor deserves a different reading: the Islamic Republic’s domestic coercion and regional confrontation belong to one governing project. The institutions pursuing confrontation also suppress opposition, while the resulting danger and deprivation justify further repression and shield the regime from accountability. Foreign powers remain responsible for their decisions, but this does not erase the regime’s responsibility for its strategic choices. Praising its regional project while condemning its domestic repression obscures the institutional and ideological continuity connecting the two blades.
Prashad accepts his framework’s conclusion explicitly: “Dear friends, neutrality or a third space does not exist in the midst of a war of aggression.” He chooses the state confronting imperial power. The letter seeks to avoid that choice by distinguishing the regime’s supposedly hollow anti-imperialism from an authentic emancipatory alternative. Both remain invested in a category whose progressive standing is largely assumed.
On their geopolitical criteria, Prashad is more consistent: the regime’s anti-imperialism is real. My objection is that its reality supplies no emancipatory legitimacy and, in the form institutionalized by the Islamic Republic, helps subordinate society to the state. Iranian experience must be allowed to challenge the assumed connection between anti-imperialism and liberation, rather than merely demonstrate an imperfect realization of an otherwise admirable project.
The dispute therefore exposes a deeper problem in the politics of solidarity. Selective recognition determines which Iranians become credible subjects of freedom; neo-orientalism reserves the authority to interpret their experiences for those claiming to represent them. Their suffering is welcomed as evidence, while their disagreement is excluded from the argument. The letter risks reproducing this hierarchy when it assumes a shared political identity that solidarity itself cannot establish.
Political tutelage defends Iranian sovereignty while subjecting Iranians’ freedoms, aspirations, and futures to external prescription. This is its neo-colonial logic: Iranians bear sacrifices others assign. Realpolitik justifies that authority by making state survival and geopolitical alignment the conditions of solidarity, protecting a strategically favored state through language that condemns domination.
Rejecting this arrangement requires more than including additional victims in an otherwise unchanged narrative. Recognition must include the authority to dispute the narrative itself. A prisoner need not be progressive, anti-imperialist, or loyal to the inheritance of 1979 to deserve freedom. Nor can advocates presume that suffering under the Islamic Republic commits someone to their preferred alternative. Iranians’ disagreements about foreign intervention, international support, and the means of political change must also remain open to argument. Opposition to foreign intervention cannot become another ideological condition they must satisfy before their aspirations deserve recognition.
There is no sustainable third space from which to endorse the Islamic Republic’s regional project while claiming solidarity with those crushed by its operation. Its geopolitical alignment provides no progressive legitimacy, and its confrontation with foreign powers supplies no grounds for suspending Iranian freedom. The survival of the regime cannot be treated as synonymous with the survival of Iran or made the overriding condition of its people’s future.
Prashad resolves the absence of a third space by standing with the Islamic Republic. I resolve it by standing against it. Solidarity must defend Iranians’ authority to reject the regime, its regional commitments, and the inheritance of 1979 without securing intellectual permission. Their lives, aspirations, and dreams are theirs to shape. Their voices count when their disagreement can change the argument, and when their freedom is defended even if it defeats their advocates’ preferred political story.

