Having driven Iranians into exile, the Islamic Republic now wants their help to restore its image.
In late August, the Islamic Republic launched a campaign to recruit prominent exiles working in business, culture, the arts and science. Seyyed Abbas Salehi, Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (Ershad) and the senior authority overseeing the censorship system, said that around one hundred people had been, or would soon be, approached about returning to Iran. He added that the regime’s offer took several forms and might amount to no more than a brief visit. The message is clear: appear alongside us and help us rehabilitate our image.
This is not a new tactic. Over recent decades, despite its policy of terror at home and abroad, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly staged such operations to present itself as an “ordinary” state. Projecting that image has become more important than ever as the regime has lost legitimacy in the eyes of most Iranians. Faced with large demonstrations by Iranians abroad in solidarity with those resisting during the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising, followed by the powerful resurgence of that mobilisation during the 2026 “Lion and Sun” uprising, the regime is attempting to combine conciliation with intimidation.
In April, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, head of Iran’s judiciary and a forceful advocate of executing detained protesters, sent a twofold message to Iranians in the diaspora. He threatened to seize the assets of those participating in protests, describing them as “traitors” allied with foreign enemies. At the same time, he expressed a willingness to collaborate with those whose anti-American and anti-Israeli positions align them more closely with the regime, “I tell these people that the homeland’s arms are open to them and that we will welcome them warmly. I should specify that we will not roll out the red carpet for those who have acted against the country’s interests, but those who are still motivated by love of the homeland will have the opportunity to return.”
The identity of the speaker matters. Mohseni Ejei, known for his zealous defence of executions, is repeating a logic that the Islamist regime has long used to justify repression: depicting those who rebel against it as instruments of the enemies of Islam and Muslims, chiefly the United States and Israel. In this instance, however, “Islam” has been replaced entirely by “the homeland”. That substitution captures the challenge now facing the regime: to a substantial part of the population, it appears as an occupying force ravaging the country. Has it not squandered the nation’s wealth to spread its ideology, pursue nuclear weapons and seek Israel’s destruction? Has it not repeatedly and violently repressed the legitimate demands of the Iranian people?
“We will take Iran back,” protesters have chanted across the country during successive uprisings over the past decade. Reza Pahlavi’s emergence as a political alternative must be understood in this context. In response, the regime is attempting to appropriate the rise in Iranian national feeling by promoting misleading narratives that cast it as the defender of the country and its people against foreign enemies.
It blames the United States and Israel for starting the war, claiming that they seek to take control of Iran. It also claims that the mass uprising of late 2025 and early 2026, which mobilised millions of Iranians across the country, was directed by Mossad agents. In doing so, the regime seeks to absolve itself of responsibility for the mass killing of tens of thousands of protesters, including women and men, adults and children. This narrative is rooted in antisemitic and anti-Western Islamist fantasies.
The Islamic Republic’s record over nearly five decades substantiates these facts. Yet part of the Iranian opposition, along with a substantial section of the international left and anti-conservative forces, turns a blind eye to this reality in the name of anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism, even at the cost of ignoring the voices of the Iranian people.
Does this context not facilitate the Islamic Republic’s attempt to secure the support of Iranians previously driven into exile by allowing them to return? Even before this initiative was launched, the regime had already singled out voices abroad that adopted anti-American and anti-Israeli positions and campaigned against Reza Pahlavi, awarding them the label of “legitimate opposition”.

