Who speaks for Iran when the regime and its people are treated as one? In Germany, appeals to peace, cultural understanding and political realism can leave the Islamic Republic’s repression out of the picture. This article examines eight recurring arguments that help Tehran’s narratives gain acceptance, and why their influence matters.
How well informed are the public and the media in Germany and Europe about the realities of Iranian society and political and social developments in Iran? To what extent might the information that media outlets, political, social and cultural institutions, and politicians receive about Iran be influenced by the Iranian regime’s narratives?
If the Iranian regime’s claims are met with doubt and disbelief, and a large part of its audience in Germany and the European Union no longer believes them, how can the government present its accounts of events in Iran so that German and European audiences are willing to accept them?
Interwoven Networks Both Visible and Hidden
In the 47 years since the Islamic Republic was established in 1979 (1357 in the Iranian calendar), the Iranian government has built networks in Germany or made use of existing ones. These include institutions, individuals, associations, religious and cultural centres and, in some cases, academic and political connections. In political and security discourse, some of these activities are described using terms such as “the Iran lobby”, “infiltration”, “influence through political propaganda” and “transnational repression”.
However, one should not assume that all these individuals and institutions belong to a single organization under unified command. What can be said with greater confidence is that this is a diverse collection of institutions, individuals, and social, religious, academic and political relationships. Some have direct connections with the Iranian government, while others support the Islamic Republic’s policies. In other cases, one can speak only of shared narratives or political alignment, which does not necessarily imply personal or organizational affiliation.
This article is not a comprehensive, documented investigation. It seeks to examine a structure in Germany, partly visible and partly hidden, that supports the Iranian regime’s interests, and to provide evidence or leads for those who want to pursue the subject further.
Some supporters of the Iranian regime, particularly among politicians, political activists, media outlets, journalists, academics, and people working in research centres, think tanks and cultural institutions, do not want to be labelled as direct defenders of the Iranian government. They may present themselves as “independent”.
Again, supporting the Iranian regime does not necessarily imply affiliation with it, receiving instructions or being paid. Political and ideological affinities, or overlapping interests, can nevertheless help prolong the regime’s survival.
Hidden Keywords
A range of individuals and networks that support the Iranian regime repeat the government’s narratives, directly or indirectly, help it survive or block decisive punitive measures against the regime in Tehran.
These individuals and institutions usually conceal their approach behind keywords such as “cultural relativism”, “pacifism”, “political realism”, “de-escalation” and “opposition to war and imperialism”.
Some try to avoid making their position explicit, but use particular language and vocabulary. Familiarity with these can help identify such approaches. These linguistic and argumentative codes and indicators can be grouped into eight categories.
Code 1: Equating the Government with the People
Mechanism: Deliberately removing the distinction between “the repressive government” and “the main victims of its repression, namely the people”. In this code, any sanctions, diplomatic isolation or punitive measures against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and government institutions are portrayed as “war against the Iranian nation” or “sanctions against the people”.
Code 2: Cultural Relativism and Framing Repression as Part of Local Culture
Mechanism: Presenting fundamental human rights values, such as freedom to choose what to wear or the abolition of the death penalty, as “colonial and Western products”. This code claims that gender apartheid or religious penal laws are part of Iranians’ traditions and local culture, and accuses Western critics of “cultural racism”.
Code 3: The Whataboutism Fallacy
Mechanism: Diverting media attention from the Iranian regime’s crimes, such as executions or the repression of protesters. In this pattern, the crime itself is not denied. Instead, US actions in Iraq, Israel’s bombing of Gaza or the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia are brought up to downplay the scale of the tragedy inside Iran.
Code 4: Manufacturing Legitimacy
Mechanism: Presenting Iran’s totalitarian system of government as “the lawful, official and legitimate representative of Iranian society as a whole”. By relying on manipulated election figures or displays of government rallies, this code gives Western audiences the impression that the regime has broad support in society.
Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Islamic Republic’s former foreign minister, would respond to human rights criticism, for example over compulsory hijab, by saying: “This is the people’s own choice. We have chosen to live this way ourselves.”
Code 5: Confusing People’s Religious Faith with Religious Fascism
Mechanism: Linking the government’s ideology and machinery of religious repression to “citizens’ religious and traditional beliefs”. This argument labels criticism of the system of sharia laws governing Iran as “an insult to a nation’s beliefs” or “Islamophobia”, in order to silence Europe’s liberal society.
Code 6: Inverted Nationalism in Foreign Policy
Mechanism: Portraying ideological hostility towards the United States, Israel, and Western culture and civilisation as “a historic national aspiration among the Iranian people”.
By omitting [the anti-government] slogans such as “they are lying that our enemy is America, our enemy is right here!”, this argument presents the IRGC’s adventurist policies as an expression of the nation’s will.
Code 7: Distorting History and Concealing Who Started the Crisis
Mechanism: Starting the historical timeline at the moment of the West’s military or diplomatic response to the regime in Tehran. This code leaves unmentioned or censors the government’s record over more than four decades: exporting the revolution, terrorism through proxies, supplying equipment to Hamas and Hezbollah, and official slogans such as “Death to America” and “Destruction of Israel”. The regime is thus cast as “a wronged victim acting in legitimate self-defence”.
Code 8: False Pacifism and Deliberate Silence about State Crimes
Mechanism: Censorship through silence and hiding behind a mask of pacifism. Here, an individual or institution does not necessarily praise the regime in order to defend it. Instead, by refusing to report on executions, human rights violations and the killing of protesters, they make the regime appear normal.
They justify engaging with the executioner and opposing punitive measures, such as designating the IRGC as a terrorist organisation, under the cover of “pacifism”, “diplomacy” and “de-escalation”, while turning a blind eye to the killing of protesters and the government’s permanent war against its own people.
The latest example is the statement “More than 200 academics and artists called for the condemnation of US threats against civilians and critical infrastructure in Iran”.
The next article will examine the shared belief that brings together these individuals from different backgrounds and political positions.
